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Much could be argued in response to each section of UDOT's brief. However, it
would be mostly repetitious. The Millers therefore focus only on the following points.

RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S
STATEMENT OF FACTS
UDOT argues that Millers have only presented facts that support their position.
When "reviewing a jury verdict, the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from
the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Appellee's Brief at
12. The Millers are not challenging the verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence.
There was certainly evidence adduced at trial that could be used to support the verdict.
This is not the issue. Miller's appeal focuses on a number of rulings by the trial court
that prevented Millers from having a fair trial, including the inability to: (1) present
relevant and important evidence; (2) explain the absence of critical evidence; (3) have the
jury properly instructed; and (4) having a fair opportunity to exercise their challenges to
prospective jurors.
ARGUMENT - REPLY BRIEF
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS REGARDING THE ACCIDENT
HISTORY DATA CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GIVEN THE MITIGATING
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE §409 PRIVILEGE

In its Statement of Facts, UDOT emphasizes that AASHTO's Roadside Design
Guide only focuses on two factors when deciding whether a median barrier is needed,
and it "is really a function of median width and traffic volume." Appellee Brief at 15. It
then emphasizes that the median width where the accident occurred was 40 feet, well
1

within the discretionary 30 to 50 feet where engineering judgment may be used to make
the decision; however, UDOT ignores the next step of AASHTO's analysis—unless there
is an accident history. The absence of accident data, therefore, became the pivotal issue
at trial.
UDOT's approach to this Court is the same as it approached the jury. It wants to
focus solely on the initial analysis—median width and traffic volume—because there is
no evidence of accident history. Therefore, it argues, AASHTO's qualification to the
initial analysis (accident history) is irrelevant. UDOT's approach is the very reason why
the trial court's refusal to allow the proposed jury instruction 51 explaining the reason
why there was no such accident data, was so prejudicial and denied Millers a fair trial.
UDOT argues that Millers had the accident reports for a period of five years
before this accident and therefore they were not prejudiced. Here, UDOT is playing both
sides of the argument.

Before trial, UDOT attacked Millers' expert, claiming that

accident data a few years before the accident cannot form the basis for UDOT's failure to
install median barriers in the 1995 and 1999 projects. It takes a few years to analyze the
data, design a construction plan, obtain funding, bid out the job and then complete the
construction. The recent data is therefore irrelevant.
By arguing that there was no prejudice because the Millers had five years of data,
UDOT wants the court to ignore that it was the accident data before 1998 that was the
critical evidence. Given the inherent delays from the analysis phase to the completion of
construction, a five year history was simply inadequate and essentially useless to the
Millers.
2

It is important to note that in the fall of 2002, a year and a half before this
accident, Daren Duersch became UDOT's Regional One Traffic Engineer for the
Northern Division. One of the first things he did as a new director was to propose the
installation of median barriers in the area where the accident occurred and northward.
UDOT refused to allow Mr. Duersch to explain why he immediately started the median
barrier project when becoming the Traffic Engineer, asserting the § 409 privilege.
Because of the inherent delays in completing such a project (preparing the designs,
obtaining funding, bidding the job, completing the project, etc.), this construction did not
start until 2005 and the median barriers were not installed until 2006. (R. 2709, pp. 45,
59-60, 62.)
The lack of accident data before 1998 affected the Millers' trial strategy. Without
the jury instruction explaining why the historical data was absent, it would have backfired
if the Millers tried to use the recent data. Such evidence could not establish the historical
accident rate applicable to the 1995 and 1999 projects. It would have opened the door to
arguments about, and focused the jury's attention on, the lack of evidence to support the
claim that UDOT should have installed the median barriers as part of the 1995 and 1999
projects.
The judge had ruled before trial that he would not give the Millers' proposed
mitigating instruction (No. 51) and ordered UDOT not to take advantage of the privilege
by arguing the lack of such evidence. Nonetheless, UDOT (subtly during trial and not so
subtly during closing argument) did the very thing that the trial court instructed UDOT
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not to do. Despite this and the Miller's renewed request, the trial court refused to change
his prior ruling and give the proposed instruction. (R. 2712, pp. 152, 160.)
Importantly, UDOT actually produced a 1994 internal memo (see copy attached to
this brief as Addendum 1, R. 235-236) pursuant to the Millers' initial Request for
Production of Documents, which verified that the area where the accident occurred had
an excessively high accident rate, the very thing which AASHTO said would require a
median barrier if the median width is between 30 and 50 feet. At UDOT's request, the
trial court excluded this evidence. Knowing that it was contrary to the actual facts,
UDOT still used the lack of accident history evidence at trial to strongly imply, if not
actually argue, that there was no accident history. Therefore, UDOT argued, the jury
should only consider the median width and volume as the determining factors. Through
this, UDOT used the privilege to perpetrate a fraud on the jury, and the Millers had no
way to explain the true situation.
UDOT also argues that the Millers only asked for the accident history from 1996
forward.

This is misleading.

Before the judge had excluded the accident history

evidence and ruled that UDOT did not have to produce any such information, the Miller's
had served formal discovery requests to obtain all documents relating to applicable area,
without a time limitation, which would include the historical accident data. See, e.g.
Requests for Production Nos. 2, 5, and 8 (R. 90, 1360-1362). It was through these
requests that UDOT inadvertently disclosed the 1994 internal memo verifying a high
accident rate.
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The Millers' subpoena to CODES and the noticed deposition of the CODES
representative were to verify the accident data that went back as far as 1971. (R. 669671.) It was the court's ruling that prevented the Millers from seeking and obtaining the
accident data before 1996. It is simply untrue that the Millers never sought to obtain the
data before 1996. The accident reports that were held by the Department of Public Safety
had all been destroyed prior to 1998. The Millers, therefore, could not obtain anything
earlier than 1998.
Finally, UDOT emphasizes that the traffic volume was the lowest average daily
traffic of any section of 1-15 in the area. Appellees Brief at 30. Again, this is misleading.
The traffic volume was very high even though it may have been the lowest when
compared to the surrounding areas. The traffic volume in 1995 was 73,755 cars per day.
(R. 2710, p. 45.) In 2003, the traffic volume was over 90,000 cars per day. (R. 2711, pp.
208, 210.) The traffic volume considered by AASHTO as the maximum amount was
only 80,000 cars per day. (R. 2710, p. 38.)
In any event, the traffic engineer should consider the increase of expected traffic
volume within the foreseeable future when designing the roadway. (R. 2710, p. 46.) The
evidence was uncontested that the traffic volume was increasing at a high rate in this area
of Davis County. (R. 2709, pp. 89-98; 2710, pp. 38-40; and 2711, pp. 215-218.)
Regardless of the traffic volume, beca use the median width was 40 feet, the
pivotal issue still involved the accident history. For this reason, the trial court's rulings
restricting the discovery and use of the historical accident data, its refiisal to give the
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Millers' explanatory instruction and its failure to prevent UDOT from using the privilege
as a sword against the Millers claims, denied the Millers a fair trial.

ARGUMENT - CROSS APPEAL
L

THE JURY INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT
REGARDING UDOT'S DUTY WAS APPROPRIATE.

UDOT argues that the trial court erred in giving Instruction 27, specifically
subparagraphs a and c of the instruction. UDOT takes no issue with the remaining
language in the instruction. The language of the instruction, when taken as a whole, is a
fair statement of UDOT's duties. Instruction 27 reads:
The Utah Department of Transportation had the legal duty to exercise
reasonable care to:
a.

investigate, analyze and evaluate roadway safety;

b
design and construct a freeway in a reasonably safe condition for
motorists; and
c.
take reasonable measures to minimize or prevent dangerous
conditions that would create unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury to motorists.
Reasonable care means what a reasonably careful government Department
of transportation would do under similar circumstances. Negligence may be in
acting or failing to act. The Department of Transportation might be required to
use more care if it were to understand that more danger was involved in a
particular situation. In contrast, a department may be able to use less care because
it would understand that less danger is involved.
UDOT is correct in arguing that this instruction is more than a simple, general
statement of the law (which UDOT argues should only be given); however, it is not true
that the language is an incorrect statement of the law.
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UDOT's duties originate from statutory language of which UDOT only quotes a
limited portion in its brief. The relevant language of the statute is quite broad:
There is created the Department of Transportation which shall:
(1) have the general responsibility for planning, research, design, construction,
maintenance, security, and safety of state transportation systems;
* * *

(4) plan, develop, construct, and maintain state transportation systems that are
safe, reliable, environmentally sensitive, and serve the needs of the traveling
public, commerce, and industry.
Utah Code Anno. §72-1-201, as amended. Subparagraph (1) is very broad, "have the
general responsibility for...safety of state transportation systems." Subparagraph (4) is
similarly broad, "plan, develop, construct, and maintain state transportation systems that
are safe....
UDOT's claimed offending language in Instruction 27 fits well within the
parameters of the broad statutory duties. In fact, it is difficult to image how the language
in the instruction would be outside of UDOT's general statutory duties. This is aptly
illustrated by using UDOT's own statement, "UDOT is obligated only to fix problems
that it knows or reasonably should know about." (Appellee's Brief at 44, emphasis
added.) How would UDOT "know" or "reasonably should know" unless it had a duty to:
"a. investigate, analyze and evaluate roadway safety"? How would UDOT have a duty to
"fix problems" unless it was required to "c. take reasonable measures to minimize or
prevent dangerous conditions that would create unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury
to motorists"?
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The duty language in the Instruction 27 is couched in terms of reasonableness.
Moreover, the last paragraph in the instruction further qualifies the duties, "Reasonable
care means what a reasonably careful government Department of
Transportation would do under similar circumstances." This language can hardly be
argued as creating new duties beyond the statutorily mandated duties.
UDOT's reliance on the single case it cites (which it claims supports its objection
to Instruction 27), Bramel v. Utah State Rd. Comm % 24 Utah 2d 50, 465 P.2d 534
(1970), seems misplaced. Bramel involved the appeal from a non-jury judgment in
plaintiffs favor based on the trial court's finding that the "State failed to give adequate,
reasonable or sufficient" warning signs for drivers approaching an upcoming danger on
the roadway.
The State appealed on two grounds, arguing that the evidence was inadequate to
support the trial court's finding that: (1) the State was negligent; and (2) the plaintiff
driver was not contributorily negligent.1 This Court affirmed the judgment and the trial
court's finding that the State did not properly "discharge its duty of exercising reasonable
care under the circumstances by placing adequate and appropriate warning signs for the
safety of traffic using the highway." Id. at 536.
Bramel did not discuss any jury instruction (there was no jury) nor did it generally
address the scope or extent of UDOT's duties. Its holding related only to the adequacy

1

Under the law at that time, contributory negligence was a complete bar to a negligence
claim.
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and appropriateness of the warning signs, an issue that was not present in the case at
hand.
Instruction 27 properly instructed the jury regarding UDOT's duties as it related to
this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and as set out in Appellant's primary brief,
Appellants respectfully request the Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for a new trial.
DATED this 12th day of May, 2011.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
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ADDENDUM

DATE:
TO

: Lynn Zollinger, P.E.
District One Assistant Director

FROM

: Mack 0. Chnstensen, P.E.
Traffic and Safety Studies Engineer

SUBJECT:

April 12, 1994

Operational Safety Report
Project No. IM-15-7 (191 }332 , South Layton to SR-193 (Interstate
Repair), Davis County

We have evaluated the accident history for the subject section of SR-15,
M.P. 332,0-338,0 for the three-year period of 1990 through 1992, with the
followma results:

INTERSTATE URBAN
No, of A c c i d e n t s
Accident Rate
Severity

1990
108
1.01
1.41

ACTUAL
1991
1992
TOTAL/AVG
118
134
360
120
1.05
1,13
1.07
1.39
1.37
1.39

Single Vehicle Ace. (31%)
Side Swipe Ace. (20%)
Rear End Ace. (19%)
Right Angle Ace. (15%)

EXPECTED
0.99
1.26

113
75
71
54

Accident data indicates that both the accident rate and severity of this
section are higher than the expected. Out of the 113 single vehicle
accidents, 92 were of the run-off-road type. Some rear-end accidents and
all of the right-angle accidents occurred at the 1-15 northbound off-ramp
with SR-108 (2000 North Antelope Drive).
We recommend that the following items be considered during design of the
project to reduce, the number/severity of accidents:
1. Provide end treatments for concrete barriers.
2. Flatten out side slopes where needed.
3. Upgrade delineators.
4. Provide rumble strips.
5. Re-do signing.
6. Inside shoulder width does not meet current standard.
7. Install backing plates on signals at all interchanges.
8. Extend barrier protecting
interchange.

structure columns at

9. Remove concrete pipe at M.P. 333.60+ (northbound).

Hill Field Road
UDOT Doc's00016

Source documents a^e avanaDie di LH« yivi^iun JI iiax^j.^ ^*~ ^^^^^s
„
aQditional analysis. If questions arise, please call me at 965-4264.
MOC/EGonzalez/cdf
cc:

Dave Miles
Mack Christensen
Eric Cheng

Dave Berg
Duncan Silver, FHWA

UDOT Doc's 00017

